Many experts consider the new US policy against Iran, known as "Economic D-Day," as a strategy to quietly exit the failed war and retreat to the previously tested front of economic warfare.
Trump and Iran; Escaping from the Pit of War to the Pit of Sanctions
Many experts consider the new US policy against Iran, known as "Economic D-Day," as a strategy to quietly exit the failed war and retreat to the previously tested front of economic warfare.
International Group Fars News Agency - US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has told his counterparts in foreign countries in recent days that "at this time" the United States is not expected to continue its military attacks against Iran and will instead focus on sanctions and economic pressure.
In a similar statement, US Treasury Secretary Scott Basnett made clear the US’s return to a policy of economic pressure on Monday when announcing a new sanctions campaign against Iran: “Trump does not want to go back to war.”
A Quiet Exit?
Many experts in the field of military affairs and sanctions issues worldwide see the new US policy, known as “economic D-Day,” as a strategy for a quiet exit from the failed war against Iran and a retreat to the previously tested front of economic warfare.
Lynette Nussbacher, a military historian and former head of the Strategic Horizons Unit at the British Cabinet Office, is among those who share this view.
In an interview with the Zionist newspaper The Jerusalem Post on Wednesday, she said that Washington is “desperate” to get out of this “swamp,” and that the Iranian government is well aware of this desperation.
The war, which Trump initially described as a “weeklong tour of duty in Iran,” has lasted six months, cost the American taxpayer tens of billions of dollars, killed hundreds of soldiers, and depleted the United States’ stockpile of some vital munitions.
In addition, energy prices have risen for American consumers and public support for military action has declined. In a recent Reuters/Ipsos poll, only 31 percent of Americans supported military action against Iran.
On the other hand, the consequences of this warmongering have strengthened the Islamic Republic’s strategic position in the region. The New York Times summarizes the situation as follows: The United States is effectively engaged in a war with Iran that has limited its leverage, exposed its vulnerabilities, and emboldened its adversary.
A cheaper bastion
In military warfare, failure or success cannot be forever hidden behind slogans: the number of troops killed, ammunition used, aircraft lost, the cost of operations, and the state of the field are too telling to sweep under the rug.
But in economic warfare, it is much easier to announce a very large operation and create a publicity frenzy over it than to fully implement it.
Washington can publish a list of new sanctions day after day, threaten companies, talk of “cutting off Iran’s economic arteries,” and set deadlines for other countries.
If the full implementation of these threats is later modified due to economic risks or the reaction of China and regional countries, it can be pretended that there was no retreat but that third parties were given a “diplomacy” opportunity or that they have a deadline to comply with the sanctions.
The Test of the Experienced
While a return to economic pressure is less costly than military action, implementing sanctions, especially at the level the United States has been promoting, is neither easy nor cost-free.
It is clear that the United States would likely have to go to large Chinese companies and banks to inflict a crippling blow on Iran’s economy—something it has so far refrained from doing.
But activating this option in the first place would mean reigniting the trade war with the country and could provoke a retaliatory response from Beijing.
China has many options for dealing effective blows to the United States, as it did in April last year when it was able to force Donald Trump to back down from the trade war by restricting exports of vital trace elements.
In addition, implementing secondary sanctions has economic consequences for the United States itself.
Jason Prince, a sanctions lawyer at the Akin Gump law firm in Washington who previously worked at the U.S. Treasury Department, told The Atlantic that secondary territories leave the U.S. vulnerable when the U.S. economy is under pressure, particularly in its technology, manufacturing, and financial sectors.
Now, if the United States were to shoulder all of these costs, it would be embarking on a path that is far from guaranteed success.
Iran has been under U.S. sanctions for decades. These sanctions have undoubtedly hurt the Iranian economy, but they have never brought Iran closer to surrendering or retreating from its national interests in favor of U.S. interests.
The other side of the coin is that the Islamic Republic of Iran has a lot of experience in adapting to sanctions.
Khaled Azim, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, says Tehran could reroute its financial transactions and conduct economic activities through alternative trade and financial channels.
So it seems that the sanctions route has been tried and failed many times before by the United States.
Steve H. Hanke, a professor of applied economics at Johns Hopkins University, told The Atlantic that the record of sanctions against Iran shows that the policy has “absolutely failed.”
“Just look at the array of sanctions that have been imposed on Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979,” said Hanke, who served on former President Ronald Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers; “they have all failed to achieve their stated goals.”
He says the military campaign has failed to bring about the swift end to the war that Trump once promised. Now the economic campaign is in danger of suffering the same fate.
